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THE QUEST FOR AN IDEAL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING PROCEDURE*
ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD**
T HE quest for an ideal administrative procedure is a hardy peren-
nial. It is evidence of the American faith in law reform as a means
of making progress. This Article pursues the quest for an ideal admin-
istrative procedure in the context of state administrative rulemaking-
the process by which state agencies create law of general applicability.'
In doing so, the Article takes the position that the ideal administrative
rulemaking system should be "political" and should be based upon a
process of "comprehensive rationality." It should also work an ade-
quate accommodation between the need for procedures calculated to
ensure that rulemaking is politically acceptable, technically sound,
lawful, and fair, and the need for effective, efficient, and economical
state government.
A "political" rulemaking process seeks to ensure that administra-
tive bodies do not adopt policies with the binding force of law when
the general public does not want those policies,2 even if the policies
desired by the agencies are technically sound, lawful, and reasonable.
Consequently, a political rulemaking process creates, and makes ef-
fective, opportunities for public political pressures to shape the ad-
ministrative rulemaking product at the time it actually occurs, and to
prevent agencies from adopting law that is unacceptable to the current
interest group balance of power in the community at large. It assumes
that because they are experts, agencies should initially formulate the
remedies for problems whose resolution has been delegated to their
discretion. But if the everyday political process in the community
*© 1990 by Arthur Earl Bonfield
* John Murray Professor, University of Iowa Law School. The author was a Reporter
(draftsman) for the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act.
1. This Article focuses upon state administrative rulemaking procedure as distinguished
from rulemaking procedure in general, which would include federal rulemaking procedure. The
differing circumstances and legal traditions of state governments as compared to the federal
government will often justify the imposition of different procedures on their respective adminis-
trative agencies. See generally Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A
CriticalAnalysis of the Status Quo, 61 Tax. L. REv. 95 (1982).
2. See generally Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: The Judicialization of Standardless
Rulemaking, REuILATION, 38 (July-Aug. 1977); Stewart, The Reformation of American Admin-
istrative Law, 88 HAgv. L. Rav. 1667 (1975).
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finds the solutions devised by those experts to be unacceptable, the
will of the agencies should be subordinated to the will of the people,
even if the latter is uninformed, unsound, or even foolish.
A political scheme of agency rulemaking is desirable because, in our
society, sovereignty resides in the community as a whole rather than in
its administrative agents. Consequently, an everyday, "politically sen-
sitive" scheme of rulemaking "seems infinitely preferable to the re-
gime of 'public policy by analysis.' ' 3 Such a scheme not only reflects
the ultimate sovereignty of the people but also acts as a relatively reli-
able means for ascertaining the current political will of the community
with respect to the exercise by agencies of rulemaking authority under
broad and open-ended delegations of power.
Of course, our legislatures could ensure that administrative rule-
making is both lawful and consistent with the will of the body politic
by imposing substantive limitations rather than procedural constraints
on agencies. Detailed and specific statutory language expressly limi-
ting rulemaking authority, coupled with judicial review, could assure
that agencies stay within the scope of their substantive powers. De-
tailed and specific statutory language could also assure that agencies
adopt rules that are substantively similar to statutes the politically re-
sponsive legislature would have adopted had the legislature attempted,
on its own, to solve the problems at which the agency rules were di-
rected. However, that means of popular control over the rulemaking
process has largely failed. Legislatures across the country have repeat-
edly delegated rulemaking authority to agencies without providing de-
tailed and specific statutory standards to guide them in the exercise of
that authority.
As a result, a political scheme for agency rulemaking is essential. It
ensures that agencies do not adopt, under the broad and open ended
delegations of authority vested in them, law that is inconsistent with
the current political will of the community.4 It does so by providing an
effective way for members of the public to organize and direct at
agencies engaged in rulemaking the same political pressures that are
directed at the legislature when it enacts legislation, thereby securing
similar substantive results: lawmaking that is compatible with the con-
temporary wishes of the body politic.
This Article also takes the position that the ideal system of adminis-
trative rulemaking should be based on a process of "comprehensive
rationality." ' Such a process requires a positive, planned, all embrac-
3. Scalia, supra note 2, at 40-41.
4. Id.
5. See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HAV. L. REv.
393 (1981).
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ing, fully informed, technically proficient, super-rational approach to
agency lawmaking. As a result, comprehensive rationality demands
that agencies precisely specify all of the goals of their rulemaking and
clearly identify all of the alternative means by which those goals may
be realized. It also requires agencies to engage in a careful, complete,
and technically sophisticated consideration of the effectiveness of each
of those alternatives and to select the alternative that will most effec-
tively achieve the desired result. In addition, a scheme of comprehen-
sive rationality requires agencies to plan in order to avoid problems
before they occur, and to take affirmative action to achieve their spec-
ified goals. Finally, it requires them to base their decisions on the
most complete and accurate information and technical analyses avail-
able .6
Because a process of comprehensive rationality requires such a posi-
tive, planned, all-embracing, fully informed, technically proficient,
super-rationalist approach to agency rulemaking, it is likely to result
in the highest quality lawmaking. Therefore, comprehensive rational-
ity embodies the ideal towards which we should strive. However,
[o]nly a superhuman decisionmaker could faithfully adhere to the
ideal of comprehensive rationality. He would have to be able to
identify goals unambiguously, which would sometimes require
reconciliation of numerous competing objectives. He would need a
Jovian imagination to conceive of every possible means to attain his
goals. Finally, he would have to anticipate the precise consequences
of adopting each alternative and to invent a metric that permits
comparison among them.7
In addition, a super-rational administrative rulemaking process can be
very expensive, since it makes virtually endless demands on the re-
sources and technical capacities of agencies. The standards of compre-
hensive rationality are also so high that agencies can almost always be
found to have fallen short, justifying the invalidation of their law for
an analytical failure.
Important competing public values necessitate compromises in the
building of an optimum agency rulemaking scheme. After all, while
we want agency rulemaking to be acceptable to the community at
large, technically sound, lawful, and fair, we also want government
administration to be effective, efficient, and economical. The first set
of desires clearly conflicts, at times, with the second, requiring accom-
6. Id. at 418-21.
7. Id. at 396.
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modations between them. Similarly, the desire for a political rulemak-
ing process may conflict with the desire for a rulemaking process
grounded on principles of comprehensive rationality. Consequently,
the optimum rulemaking process may fall somewhat short of the theo-
retical ideals embodied in undiluted notions of political responsibility
and comprehensive rationality. Nevertheless, the optimum scheme for
administrative rulemaking must accommodate all of these competing
desires so that the realization of each is maximized to the extent feasi-
ble and practicable and their relative values in particular contexts are
appropriately expressed.
In pursuing the quest for an ideal state administrative rulemaking
process, this Article focuses upon the rulemaking and rule review pro-
visions of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act
(MSAPA), 8 the most recent effort to formulate a comprehensive set of
procedures on this subject. Those procedures create a political rule-
making system that reflects the values of comprehensive rationality.
However, they also strike a reasonable accommodation between the
need for procedures calculated to ensure that state agency rulemaking
is politically acceptable, technically sound, lawful, and fair, and the
often conflicting need to ensure effective, efficient, and economical
state government administration.
The provisions of the MSAPA relating to rules have four principal
objectives. 9 First, they are designed to ensure that agency rulemaking
determinations are democratic, in the sense that the body politic may
effectively thwart the adoption of rules that are politically unaccepta-
ble even if they are technically sound and lawful. To accomplish this
purpose, the MSAPA provides means by which the public can moni-
tor, and organize effective political opposition to, the adoption of a
rule. Additionally, it provides means by which elected officials may
veto rules adopted by agencies that are inconsistent with the will of
their constituents. Second, the MSAPA provisions are designed to fa-
cilitate the making of technically sound rules. For this purpose, an
agency engaged in rulemaking is required to elicit from members of
the public all of the information relevant to the merits of a proposed
rule and to provide them with an opportunity to controvert any such
information. The agency must then consider all of this data and ex-
plain its precise reasons for adopting the rule in light of that data.
B. UNFoRM LAW Comh cIonEgs' MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1981),
14 U.L.A. 70 (1990) [hereinafter 1981 MSAPA]. For a detailed analysis of the rulemaking provi-
sions of the 1981 MSAPA, see A. Bornmw, STATE ADwmsRATrvE RULEMAKING (1986 and
Supp. 1989).
9. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at Article III Comment (discussing explicitly three
principal objectives and implying a fourth).
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Third, the MSAPA provisions are calculated to ensure that agency
rulemaking determinations are lawful. To achieve this objective, they
focus attention on the information necessary to determine the legality
of a proposed rule, and establish an accessible record that is adequate
to facilitate such a determination. In addition, the MSAPA provides
several mechanisms for the external review of the legality of rules. Fi-
nally, these provisions of the MSAPA are also calculated to ensure, in
a general sense, that the process of agency rulemaking is fair by pro-
viding a proper balance between the prior three objectives of rulemak-
ing procedures and the need for effective, efficient, and economical
government administration. They also provide various opportunities
for members of the public to obtain information about the rulemak-
ing process, to participate in the process, and to have adequate notice
of and time to adjust to the requirements of new rules before they
take effect. In addition, they provide means by which persons who are
affected by the process and who believe they have been improperly
treated by the process in a particular instance may seek relief from the
action involved.
I. SPECiFic RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
Following the law in most states, the MSAPA defines a "rule" to
mean the whole or a part of any agency statement of general applica-
bility that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, and in-
cludes the amendment or repeal of an existing "rule."' 0 It does not
matter what the agency calls the statement. If it fits the definition of a
"rule," it is subject to the rulemaking and rule review requirements of
the MSAPA.
A political model of rulemaking and principles of comprehensive
rationality require opportunities for the general public to ascertain on
a continuous basis the nature and content of proposed agency rule-
making. Therefore, to facilitate the monitoring of the rulemaking
process by the community at large, the MSAPA imposes several re-
quirements. It requires each agency to maintain a public rulemaking
docket that indicates all rulemaking by the agency currently in process
and all of the relevant information about each proposed rule." It also
requires that a rulemaking proceeding be commenced by the publica-
tion of a notice of the proposed rule in a widely disseminated adminis-
trative bulletin, at least thirty days before adoption of the rule. 2 That
10. Id. § 1-102(10).
11. Id. § 3-102.
12. Id. § 3-103(a).
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notice must contain a statement of the purpose of the proposed rule,
an indication of the specific legal authority of the agency to issue the
rule, its full text, and an indication of where, when, and how indivi-
duals may communicate their views on the proposed rule to the
agency." Publication of the full text of a proposed rule is required to
ensure that members of the public have fair notice of the precise ac-
tion contemplated by the agency and an opportunity to ascertain accu-
rately the effect of the contemplated rule on their interests.
Publication of a summary of the proposed rule will often not be ade-
quate to permit potentially affected persons to determine the precise
effect of that rule, if adopted, on their interests.
After the required notice publication, members of the public may
participate in the rulemaking proceeding. Such participation imple-
ments the ideal of comprehensive rationality because it helps to assure
that the agency is informed of all information relevant to the technical
merits of its proposed rule. That participation also implements the po-
litical model of rulemaking because it helps to create an environment
in which the agency may be made aware of, and be forced by public
pressures to respond to, the contemporary wishes of the community at
large.
The MSAPA gives members of the public a right to submit written
input on the proposed rule.' 4 It also requires an oral legislative or ar-
gument-style proceeding on a proposed rule, if such an oral proceed-
ing is demanded by a specified legislative committee, the governor's
administrative rules counsel, a political subdivision, an agency, or
twenty-five persons." An oral rulemaking proceeding must be open to
the public and be recorded. 6 Subject to reasonable agency rules of
procedure, any person may participate in that oral proceeding. 7 The
agency, a member of the agency, or another person may preside over
an oral rulemaking proceeding; but if the agency itself does not pre-
side over the proceeding, a summary of its contents must be prepared
for the agency by the person who did preside. 8
It would be undesirable to require such an oral proceeding in every
rulemaking. After all, an oral proceeding will usually be more expen-
sive than a wholly written proceeding and will often be no more effec-
13. Id.
14. Id. § 3-104(a).
15. Id. § 3-104(b)(1). Note that the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120,
Florida Statutes, requires a "public hearing" on a proposed rule if any affected person demands
such an oral proceeding. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1989).
16. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-104(b)(3).
17. Id. § 3-104(b).
18. Id. § 3-104(b)(3).
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tive than a wholly written proceeding. Therefore, the costs of
requiring such a proceeding in every rulemaking are likely to outweigh
its benefits. Furthermore, the particular demands established by the
MSAPA as a precondition to the imposition of a requirement that an
oral proceeding be held in a rulemaking appear to provide a reasona-
ble basis for distinguishing between those instances in which the costs
of holding such an oral proceeding are likely to be justified and those
in which they are not.
It should be stressed that, in rulemaking, the MSAPA only creates a
right, after a proper request, to an oral legislative or argument-type
hearing. It does not create a right to a judicial or trial-type hearing in
such a proceeding. There are several reasons for this. Trial-type proce-
dures are calculated to settle disputed facts of particular applicability
that are normally of a very specific and narrow nature. Confrontation
of witnesses and the rebuttal and cross-examination of witnesses has
proven to be helpful for this purpose. However, rulemaking is de-
signed to formulate general policy. One cannot prove through the use
of trial-type procedures that a certain policy is desirable. That conclu-
sion embodies a value judgment, even though it may be based in part
on disputed facts of a broad nature-legislative facts. A universal
right to a trial-type hearing in rulemaking would seriously affect the
efficiency of agencies, and the costs of those procedures would almost
always exceed their benefits.' 9 Most of the information needed by the
agency and opposing parties in a rulemaking proceeding may be ob-
tained through inexpensive notice and comment procedures. Require-
ments of judicial-style hearings in rulemaking with cross-examination
of witnesses have proved very burdensome. Trial-type proceedings in
rulemaking tend to be drawn out, repetitious, and unproductive, and
have often been used solely for delaying agency action. Even where
factual issues are in dispute, those issues are usually too broad and
too general for successful resolution by trial-type procedures.
It could be argued that to implement the ideal of comprehensive
rationality, trial-type procedures should be available to resolve spe-
cific factual issues that may arise in a rulemaking proceeding. In that
way participants in a rulemaking would have an opportunity to exam-
ine the information on which an agency relies in the proceeding, and a
fully effective opportunity to rebut that information. However, re-
quirements of a public rulemaking record, a statement of the purpose
of a proposed rule, and a statement of reasons for its adoption, in
19. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 2 RECOMMNDATIONS AND REP. AD-
huN. CoNp. U.S. 834, 870-71 (1970-1972).
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combination with a right to make written and oral submissions on a
proposed rule, go a long way toward accomplishing that result at a
much lower cost than would be engendered by the use of trial-type
procedures; and the MSAPA imposes all of those requirements on
rulemaking proceedings subject to its provisions. 2° Furthermore, an
agency, in its discretion, may make trial-type procedures available in
MSAPA rulemaking proceedings 2' whenever it determines that they
would be especially helpful and their benefits would outweigh their
costs.
Of course, special statutes may also require trial-type hearings for
narrowly drawn and clearly identified classes of rulemaking of certain
agencies in light of the special characteristics of those particular clas-
ses of rulemaking. But the circumstances justifying such special legis-
lative action are likely to be rare because, in the overwhelming
number of situations, the costs of required trial-type proceedings in
rulemaking will far exceed their benefits. To implement the ideal of
comprehensive rationality, however, it may be desirable to add an ex-
plicit provision to the MSAPA authorizing persons to petition for
trial-type procedures in rulemaking on the basis of a claim that those
procedures would, in the particular circumstances, be a useful and ef-
ficient way of resolving important disputed factual issues. To obtain
those procedures, the petitioner would have to persuade the agency
that the procedures the agency had already provided in that rulemak-
ing were insufficient, and that the additional procedures requested
were desirable and appropriate under the circumstances because their
benefits clearly outweighed their costs. A provision of this kind might
explicitly require the agency to either grant petitioner's request for
those additional procedures or to issue a statement of reasons for its
refusal. This would create a record for judicial review.2 However, the
proposed provision should clearly state that an agency is not required
to grant such a petition and that the agency's determination that the
benefits of trial-type procedures do not outweigh their costs in this
context is presumed correct and will not be overturned on judicial re-
view in the absence of a very strong showing that it is wholly unrea-
sonable. Even so, such a provision could be undesirable because the
availability of judicial review to challenge the denial of such a petition
might be used to coerce agencies into providing trial-type procedures
20. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at §§ 3-112, 103(a)(1), -104(a), (b)(1), -110.
21. Id. § 1-103(c).
22. Barr, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking Procedure: When May Something More
Formal Be Required?, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 781, 812-17 (1978).
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in rulemaking in situations in which they are not justified on a cost-
benefit basis. 23
In specified circumstances the MSAPA requires an agency to issue a
cost-benefit, regulatory analysis for a proposed rule.2' It must also
publish a summary of the analysis in a timely manner and make cop-
ies of the full analysis available to members of the public. 25 Unless
waived, that analysis must describe "the classes of persons who prob-
ably will be affected by the proposed rule," the "impact of the pro-
posed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons,"
and "the probable costs" to the government of implementing and en-
23. Note that the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989),
contains a "draw out" provision allowing persons affected by a rulemaking proceeding to turn it
into a trial-type format, whether or not the agency believes that the benefits of that format
would exceed its costs. A petitioner has a right to such a trial-type proceeding in rulemaking
whenever he or she "affirmatively demonstrates" to the agency that petitioner's "substantial
interests will be affected" by the proposed rule, and that "the proceeding does not [otherwise]
provide [an] adequate opportunity to protect those interests." This provision may be defective in
two respects. The provision may be overbroad because it does not recognize that even when
"substantial interests" of a petitioner may be affected and petitioner can demonstrate that the
proceeding "does not provide an adequate opportunity to protect those interests," the costs to
the community of turning the proceeding into the trial-type format deemed necessary by peti-
tioner to protect the interests at stake may far exceed the specific benefits of that format to
either the petitioner or to others who are similarly situated. The Florida provision may be unwise
even if the merits of this argument are unconvincing, or even if this argument is based upon a
misconstruction of the language of the provision. This is so because, in its current form, the
provision may provide a mechanism with which petitioners, in practice, could coerce agencies
into providing trial-type procedures in rulemaking proceedings when they are not justified. After
all, agencies could seek to protect themselves against the realistic threat of law suits with unpre-
dictable outcomes that challenge their failure to provide trial-type procedures by automatically
providing those additional procedures whenever they are requested. This would be an undesira-
ble result because it would mean the use of trial-type procedures in many rulemaking proceed-
ings in which their costs exceed their benefits. However, empirical data is necessary to resolve
this question in a definitive manner.
Section 1-107(a)(2) of the 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, appears to differ from this Florida
statutory provision in at least one respect. Unlike the Florida provision, the MSAPA provision
does not require an agency to convert a rulemaking proceeding into any other kind of proceeding
unless another provision of law mandates that result, and the Model Act does not contain any
provision that explicitly requires an agency, wholly on its own authority, to convert a rulemaking
proceeding, in which trial-type procedures are normally unavailable, into an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding, in which they are available. Cf. 1981 MSAPA § 4-101(b). The only Model Act provision
that might be read to require that result implicitly is § 5-116(cX8)(iv), which authorizes a court to
invalidate agency action that is "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." But that provision may
not require trial-type procedures upon request in every rulemaking in which "substantial inter-
ests" of petitioner may be affected and petitioner can demonstrate that "the proceeding does not
[otherwise] provide [an] adequate opportunity to protect those interests." FLA. STAT. §
120.54(17) (1989). The reason for this is, as noted earlier, that the costs of trial-type procedures
in rulemaking may, even in those circumstances, sometimes exceed their benefits and, therefore,
justify an agency's refusal to allow them even after such a request.
24. See infra text accompanying note 29.
25. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-105(d), (e).
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forcing the proposed rule. 26 The regulatory analysis must also contain,
unless waived, "a comparison of the probable costs and benefits of
the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of inaction," an
assessment "of whether there are less costly methods or less intrusive
methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule," and an indi-
cation "of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the
proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency" and the
reasons for their rejection. 27 Finally, the data relied upon must be
quantified, where possible, and the analysis must consider both short-
term and long-term consequences.n
The regulatory analysis requirement implements both the ideal of
comprehensive rationality and the political model of rulemaking be-
cause it is calculated to ensure an adequate opportunity for the agency
and the public to evaluate the desirability of a proposed rule and an
adequate opportunity for those who oppose it to do so effectively.
That is, this requirement structures agency and public consideration
of the technical merits of proposed rules in a helpful way and facili-
tates the political process surrounding the adoption of proposed rules.
An agency is required to issue such a cost-benefit, regulatory analy-
sis with respect to a proposed rule only if the governor, a specified
legislative committee, a political subdivision, an agency, or 300 per-
sons signing one request, formally demand such a statement. 29 The
preparation of a regulatory analysis is "very burdensome" and expen-
sive.30 In most instances of state agency rulemaking, the costs of pre-
paring such a formal, detailed regulatory analysis will far exceed the
benefits of such an analysis. Consequently, the MSAPA does not im-
pose the regulatory analysis requirement on all agency rulemaking.3'
Furthermore, there is a large potential for disagreement about the ac-
curacy of the contents of such an analysis. 2 Therefore, if the right to
demand a regulatory analysis were not limited, opponents of proposed
rules could request the issuance of these time-consuming and expen-
sive statements simply to harass agencies, or to delay their rulemaking
without any compensating public benefit. Moreover, if agencies were
26. Id. § 3-105(b). One or more of these requirements may be waived by the persons re-
questing issuance of the analysis. See infra text accompanying note 29.
27. Id. § 3-105(b).
28. Id. § 3-105(c).
29. Id. § 3-105(a).
30. Id. § 3-105 Comment.
31. The 1981 MSAPA rejects, therefore, the approach of the Florida APA, FLA. STAT. §
120.54(2)(b) (1989), because the latter appears to require the issuance of such a formal statement
in every rulemaking.
32. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-105 Comment.
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required to issue such an analysis in every instance of rulemaking,
agencies would be likely to compile those statements in a haphazard
way, to divert resources to that task from more essential functions, or
to deemphasize policymaking by rules in favor of ad hoc adjudicatory
orders that could subsequently be relied upon as precedent. 3
Although the MSAPA suggests that a specified legislative commit-
tee, the governor, a political subdivision, an agency, or 300 persons
signing one request may invoke the regulatory analysis requirement, it
may be desirable to limit the prerogative of invoking this expensive
and easily abused requirement to individuals or bodies who are them-
selves subject to direct political checks. That is, states may want to
require the issuance of such a regulatory analysis in rulemaking "only
upon demand by directly elected officials with general responsibility
for state government.' ' Then there will be at least some assurance
that the power to trigger this onerous agency duty will not be used
indiscriminately and in a way that is inconsistent with the larger public
interest.
If a state decides to allow members of the public to invoke this re-
quirement, it should require an effective demand for a regulatory
analysis to be signed by a significant number of persons. It should
also authorize a waiver of the requirement, once it has been invoked,
by a designated legislative committee or the governor when those offi-
cials believe the costs of the analysis will exceed its benefits. This
waiver device could be an effective check against abuse of the regula-
tory analysis requirement by persons seeking only to delay issuance of
a clearly, justifiable rule or to harass the issuing agency. It would seem
wise to vest such a checking power in politically responsible officials
who are independent of the agency and, therefore, who would be con-
cerned with the public interest generally rather than with the narrow
interests of the agency involved.
The Model Act makes clear that so long as the agency makes a
"good faith effort to comply," a "rule may not be invalidated on the
ground that the contents of the regulatory analysis are insufficient or
inaccurate." '3 For this purpose, "'good faith' must be ascertained
•.. without any judicial evaluation of the actual sufficiency or accu-
racy of the contents of that regulatory analysis." 3 6 Consequently, a
33. For an elaboration of the reasons why agency policymaking by ad hoc adjudicatory
orders is less desirable than agency policymaking by rulemaking, see Bonfield, State Administra-
tive Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 Arnmm. L. REv. 121
(1990).
34. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-105 Comment (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 3-105(f).
36. Id. § 3-105 Comment.
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reviewing court will "only determine if the analysis was actually is-
sued, and if on its face it actually addresses in some manner all of the
l . . [information] specified in [the Act]. If so, the sufficiency or accu-
racy of [the] . . . contents [of the analysis] are not subject to judicial
review." 37
A limiting standard governing judicial review of regulatory analyses
is essential to an ideal rulemaking procedure. Such a restrictive stan-
dard is necessary because judicial review of regulatory analyses could
be used by opponents of rules solely to harass the issuing agencies and
to delay their rulemaking efforts. Obviously, calculations of the kind
that must be embodied in regulatory analyses cannot be made with
precision. Analyses will inevitably contain educated guesses that will
only be rough approximations. Certainly the courts should not be em-
powered to second-guess agencies in such circumstances. If they were
empowered to do so, the litigation dealing with the adequacy of those
statements would be endless and unproductive, and would only serve
to delay or prevent the adoption of rules that necessarily must rest on
educated guesses and rough approximations. However, if an agency
entirely defaults in its duty to issue a regulatory analysis after a proper
written request, or fails to comply with other requirements imposed in
relation to such an analysis, grounds may exist for judicial invalida-
tion of the rule. Only the "adequacy" of the "contents" of that regu-
latory analysis should be removed from judicial review. This is the
position of the MSAPA.
However, the MSAPA provision limiting judicial review of regula-
tory analyses might have been better drafted if it simply stated that
the "adequacy of the contents of the regulatory analysis is not subject
to judicial review." '38 All of the reasons that should make us appre-
37. Id.
38. Florida provides an illustration of the difficulties that courts may face when unres-
tricted judicial review of an impact statement requirement is available. The Florida APA re-
quires agencies to make "detailed economic impact statement[s]" when they issue rules. FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(2)(b) (1989). The courts have struggled to determine whether the absence of such
a statement or the inadequacy of the contents of such a statement would render the relevant rule
invalid. In Division of Workers' Compensation v. McKee, 413 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982), the court found that the complete absence of an impact statement was not harmless error
and, therefore, the rule in question was invalid. In Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Wright, 439 So.2d 937, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court held a rule invalid because
of the inadequacy of the impact statement that accompanied its proposal. On the other hand, in
Cortese v. School Bd., 425 So.2d 554, 558 n.12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the complete absence of an
economic impact statement for a school closing was deemed to be harmless error because there
was no showing that the absence of the impact statement harmed the "board's decisionmaking
process or adversely affected its decision." And in Plantation Residents' Assoc. v. School Bd.,
424 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), a Florida court concluded that "if proceedings are not
rendered unfair, or if the action is not found to be incorrect, then minimal deficiencies in an
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hensive about the potential for endless judicial review proceedings re-
lated to these analyses may support such a broad and unqualified
prohibition on judicial review of the "adequacy" of their "contents."
The current MSAPA formulation could open the door to litigation
over whether, in each particular instance where such an analysis is re-
quired, the issuing agency actually engaged in a "good faith effort to
comply with the requirements" of the MSAPA relating to the con-
tents of such an analysis. A broad and unqualified prohibition on ju-
dicial review of the "adequacy" of the "contents" of regulatory
analyses may, therefore, more successfully deter wasteful suits con-
cerning these analyses.
The MSAPA provides that within 180 days of a specified point in a
rulemaking proceeding, the agency must either terminate the proceed-
ing or adopt the proposed rule.3 9 This provision implements the politi-
cal model of rulemaking by ensuring that an agency may not, if it
encounters significant public resistance to its published proposals, al-
low a long time to pass so that the public forgets about the pendency
of that proceeding, and then, without additional notice, adopt those
controversial proposals. However, before it adopts a rule, an agency
must consider all of the written and oral submissions or memoranda
summarizing the oral submissions and any regulatory analyses per-
taining to that rule. 40 This provision implements the ideal of compre-
hensive rationality by ensuring that the agency actually weighs the
merits of all of the information tendered to it in the public proceeding
before it takes final action on the proposed rule.
The Model Act prohibits an agency from adopting a rule that is
"substantially different" from the proposed rule contained in the no-
tice that initiated the rulemaking proceeding on which the adopted
rule is based. 4' Specific criteria are included in the MSAPA to illumi-
economic impact statement will not constitute reversible error." See also Health Care & Retire-
ment Corp. of Am. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 463 So.2d 1175, 1178
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (agency rule not invalid because economic impact statement was not as
detailed as possible; such rules will be struck down only if a deficiency in the economic impact
statement impairs fairness).
The approach suggested in the text is preferable to the limitless scope of review used by courts
in Florida to review agency conformance with the economic impact statement requirement be-
cause the former is more likely to deter litigation than the latter. The reason for this is that the
approach suggested in the text totally precludes review of the adequacy of the contents of a
regulatory analysis, leaving for review only a failure to issue such an analysis or a failure to
comply with some other requirement relating to an analysis. It is true, however, that on the latter
issues, courts will have to struggle with the principle of prejudicial error in much the same way
as the Florida courts have in the above cases. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 5-116(c).
39. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-106(b).
40. Id. § 3-106(c).
41. Id. § 3-107(a).
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nate that "substantially different" standard. Three factors must be
considered in determining whether the adopted rule is "substantially
different" from the proposed rule. First, the agency and reviewing
court must consider "the extent to which all persons affected by the
adopted rule should have understood that the published proposed rule
would affect their interests." 42 Second, the agency and reviewing court
must consider "the extent to which the subject matter of the adopted
rule or the issues determined by that rule are different from the sub-
ject matter or issues involved in the published proposed rule." ' 43 Fi-
nally, they must consider "the extent to which the effects of the
adopted rule differ from the effects of the published proposed rule
had it been adopted instead."44 Although application of these criteria
will not entirely remove the ambiguity surrounding the term "substan-
tially different," the criteria provide important guidance for determin-
ing the acceptability of a particular variance.
The purpose of the "substantially different" requirement is to en-
sure that the public has had an adequate opportunity in the rulemak-
ing proceeding to comment on the substance of the final rule before it
was adopted. Without such a provision, an agency might frustrate
that opportunity by holding a rulemaking proceeding on one proposal
and subsequently adopting a wholly different rule with respect to
which members of the public had no notice, and to which they might
have objected, had its contents been anticipated at the time of the
rulemaking proceeding. Consequently, the "substantially different"
requirement implements both the comprehensive rationality ideal and
the political model of rulemaking. The requirement helps to ensure
that members of the public have an opportunity to make the agency
aware of all relevant information concerning the technical merits of
the rule it actually adopts, and that members of the public have an
opportunity to organize and direct at the agency whatever political
pressures they are disposed to create in light of the rule the agency
actually adopts.
In order to reconcile the need for the rulemaking procedures of the
MSAPA with the need for effective, efficient, and economical govern-
ment, the Model Act provides a general good cause exemption from
those procedures. Rulemaking procedures may be omitted to the ex-
tent they are, in a particular situation, "unnecessary, impracticable,
or contrary to the public interest." '45 When an agency relies on this
42. Id. § 3-107(b)(1).
43. Id. § 3-107(b)(2).
44. Id. § 3-107(b)(3).
45. Id. § 3-108(a).
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provision it must publish a finding that the omitted procedures are
unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public interest, and in-
clude a brief statement of its underlying reasons for that finding. 46 To
avoid agency abuse of the good cause exemption and to discourage its
use by agencies in close cases, the MSAPA also shifts the burden of
persuasion to the agency as to the propriety of the invocation of this
provision.4 7
The "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public inter-
est" standard contained in the MSAPA good cause provision is pref-
erable to the "imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare"
standard contained in the good cause exemption of most state
APA's. The standard contained in the MSAPA is more flexible than
the standard contained in most state acts in two respects. First, the
MSAPA standard allows agencies to bypass ordinary rulemaking pro-
cedures in particular circumstances to the extent that following them
would cause a future or an immediate harm. Under the standard in
most state acts, those procedures could be omitted only to prevent an
immediate harm. Second, the MSAPA standard also allows agencies
to omit normal rulemaking procedures in particular circumstances to
the extent their use is "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the
public interest," meaning to the extent those procedures would cause
harm that is disproportionate to the benefit that would accrue from
their use. The good cause standard contained in most state APA's,
however, allows rulemaking procedures to be omitted only to avoid a
"peril"-a very serious harm-to the "public health, safety, or wel-
fare." 49
The greater flexibility of the MSAPA provision is justified if one
believes that required rulemaking procedures should result in efficient,
effective, and economical government, as well as in adequate protec-
tion for private rights against unsound or illegal agency action. It
should be noted that the MSAPA good cause exemption contains a
number of safeguards against its misuse in order to preserve as much
protection for private rights as is possible in this context. Consider the
narrow scope of the standard used in light of its language and the
extensive case law and commentary construing it in a conservative
46. Id. § 3-108(a).
47. Id. § 3-108(b).
48. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 3(b) (National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws 1961), 14 U.L.A. 371 (1980) [hereinafter 1961 MSAPA]. The
APA's of most states are based on the 1961 MSAPA, 14 U.L.A. 357, 371 (1980). See also FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(9)(a) (1989) ("immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare").
49. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 48, at § 3(b).
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manner.50 As noted earlier, an agency must also publish specific find-
ings and reasons to rely upon this exemption; upon judicial review, it
also must bear the burden of persuasion as to the propriety of the
invocation of this exemption. Furthermore, as noted next, there is an
opportunity for post hoc rulemaking proceedings in some situations in
which this exemption has been used. All of these protections are likely
to minimize agency abuse of the good cause provision.
The MSAPA allows agencies properly relying upon the terms of its
good cause exemption to issue permanent rules thereunder, except
where, in a particular instance, the governor or a designated legislative
committee formally objects to the issuance of those rules without ben-
efit of usual rulemaking procedures." In that exceptional situation,
the otherwise permanent rules issued under the good cause exemption
are effective only for 180 days, "forcing the agency to conduct a usual
rulemaking proceeding on those rules if the agency wishes them to
remain effective for a longer period."5 2 This provision is intended to
ensure that a post hoc rulemaking proceeding will be held for a rule
initially issued without usual procedures on the basis of the good
cause exemption, when the rule is sufficiently controversial that a po-
litically responsible official believes such an expensive procedure is
justified.
It may be argued that it would be better to require agencies, in
every case where they have properly dispensed with usual rulemaking
procedures on the basis of the good cause exemption, to follow those
procedures within 90 days of the effective date of the rule issued in
reliance upon that exemption.53 However, this position is unsound.
For some rules, the use of usual rulemaking procedures is undesirable
both before their initial issuance and at all times thereafter because
the costs of those procedures will predictably exceed their benefits in
both situations. However, on this basis, a case may be made for dis-
50. See Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property,
Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 588-608 (1970); Jordan, The
Administrative Procedure Act's "Good Cause" Exemption, 36 ADan. L. Rav. 113 (1984); An-
notation, Exceptions Under 5 USCS § 553(b)(A) and § 553(b)(B) to Notice Requirements of
Administrative Procedure Act Rule Making Provisions, 45 A.L.R. FED. 12, 74-97 (1979).
51. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-108(c).
52. Id. § 3-108 Comment.
53. Rago, Rulemaking Under the Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Opportu-
nity Missed, 34 ADNa,. L. Rv. 445, 454 (1982). The Florida APA, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(c)
(1989), concurs. See also Recommendation 83-2, 1983 ACUS Report 7, 9. That Recommenda-
tion is not as broad as the Rago proposal or the Florida APA because it would only require post
hoc rulemaking proceedings in instances where the "impracticable" or "contrary to the public
interest" exemption is used, but not in instances where the "unnecessary" exemption is used. Id.
at 9.
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tinguishing between the three MSAPA good cause grounds for exemp-
tion from usual procedures with respect to the permanency of the
rules issued thereunder. Perhaps agencies should be able to issue per-
manent rules without benefit of usual procedures only on the basis of
the "unnecessary" exemption. Perhaps rules issued without benefit of
usual procedures under the "impracticable" and "contrary to the
public interest" exemptions should be limited by statute to a specified
brief period, unless they are extended or made permanent through the
use of all normally applicable rulemaking procedures. This distinction
is based on practical considerations. When usual procedures are "un-
necessary" there is no utility in subjecting the rules involved to those
procedures either before or after the rules are issued; but when usual
procedures are "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest,"
there may be utility in subjecting the rules involved to those proce-
dures after the rules are adopted, even if important values dictate their
omission beforehand.
The principal deficiency of this approach is that it is overbroad-it
would require post hoc rulemaking proceedings in some instances
where rules had been issued without the benefit of usual procedures
because those procedures were "impracticable" or "contrary to the
public interest," when the cost of those subsequent procedures would
clearly outweigh their benefits. For this reason, the MSAPA solution
to this problem may be best. As noted, it requires post hoc procedures
only for those rules issued under the good cause exemption as to
which a determination has been made, by designated politically re-
sponsible public officials who are independent of the agencies adopt-
ing the rules, that the cost of subsequent rulemaking procedures is
outweighed by their benefits. The new Model Act assumes that the
power to turn rules properly issued under this exemption from perma-
nent rules into temporary rules, thereby requiring an agency to subject
them post hoc to usual rulemaking procedures in order to extend their
effectiveness, is too potent and significant to be vested in affected
members of the public. After all, members of the public are likely to
use such a power to make temporary rules out of permanent rules
properly issued under the good cause exemption whenever they do not
like them. Therefore, they are likely to do so even when the cost of
the post hoc rulemaking proceedings would clearly outweigh any of
their potential benefits.
The Model Act also addresses the need for post-adoption proce-
dures for rules properly issued without benefit of pre-adoption proce-
dures in its provision dealing with petitions for the adoption of rules.
54
54. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-117.
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Any person who is dissatisfied with a rule issued without benefit of
pre-adoption procedures under the general good cause exemption may
file a petition with the issuing agency containing comments on the
adopted rule, with a specific request for its amendment or repeal. An
agency must, within 60 days of the time it receives such a petition,
either deny the petition, indicating in writing its reasons for doing so,
or initiate rulemaking proceedings on the subject of that petition.
Agencies must also provide specific procedures for the submission and
consideration of those petitions and for their form. Each petition and
the agency's written response must be included in the agency rulemak-
ing record required for all rules, including rules issued pursuant to the
good cause exemption." So, any post-adoption petition for repeal or
amendment of a rule issued under the good cause exemption, and the
agency's response to that petition, will be a part of the formal record
reviewed by the court on judicial review of the rule.
In sum, the MSAPA right to petition for the amendment or repeal
of a rule can adequately achieve most of the objectives sought by re-
quiring agencies to hold a post-adoption rulemaking proceeding when-
ever they do not hold such a proceeding before adopting a rule
because of the good cause exemption. And it does so at a minimum
cost to the agencies and in a way that preserves for affected persons as
much of the benefits as may reasonably be expected from such post
hoc proceedings. Therefore, the right to petition, in conjunction with
the MSAPA provision empowering the designated legislative commit-
tee or the governor to require a standard rulemaking proceeding as a
prerequisite to the continued effectiveness of a rule issued under this
general exemption, appears to provide adequate protection for af-
fected persons against rules issued for good cause without the benefit
of usual procedures.
The MSAPA differs from most existing state APA's by broadly ex-
empting from required rulemaking procedures all "interpretative
rules"-rules that only define "the meaning of a statute or other pro-
vision of law or precedent if the agency does not possess delegated
authority to bind the courts to any extent with its definition. 5 6 To
eliminate some of the dangers of that exemption, however, the Act
requires a court reviewing the lawfulness of such rules adopted with-
out usual procedures to review their propriety wholly anew, without
any deference whatsoever to the agency interpretation. 7
55. Id. § 3-112(b)(7).
56. Id. § 3-109(a).
57. Id. § 3-109(b).
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A number of reasons support this categorical exemption for inter-
pretative rules. First, there appears to be no means to enforce effec-
tively a requirement that notice and comment procedures be followed
in interpretative rulemaking. That is why agencies in virtually all
states requiring notice and comment rulemaking for interpretative
rules have completely ignored the requirement in practice, and have
done so with impunity. Suppose an agency issues a wholly interpreta-
tive rule without following usual procedures. Suppose, also, that a
court subsequently voids the improperly issued interpretative rule be-
cause it was not adopted pursuant to applicable procedures. The
agency could still issue an ad hoc construction of the law interpreted
by the void rule, applying the ad hoc construction (which, of course,
would be identical to the content of the void rule) to the particular
case at hand. After all, the agency is still bound to enforce the law
which the void rule sought to interpret; and in the absence of a statute
providing otherwise, the agency may do so initially by an ad hoc con-
struction of that law applicable only to the case at hand, rather than
by an interpretative rule issued in advance of any enforcement action
in a particular case.
It is true, of course, that on judicial review of a particular case, an
agency action expressly relying on an improperly adopted interpreta-
tive rule may be vacated because of the agency's impermissible reli-
ance on the void rule. But on remand, the agency may adjudicate an
identical interpretation as applied only to that particular case, and the
law declared in such an adjudication may usually be retrospective.
Furthermore, on judicial review of such a case, the court might even
decide that the substantive principle embodied in the void interpreta-
tive rule is correct as a matter of law, without ordering a remand of
the case to the agency that issued the procedurally improper rule.
Therefore, "[tihe practical effectiveness of any available remedy for a
procedurally improper agency issuance of an interpretative rule is in
doubt."' 8
Second, persons affected by interpretative rules do not need notice
and comment rulemaking procedures to protect their interests to the
same extent that persons affected by legislative rules need those proce-
dures to protect their interests. This is so because, with respect to leg-
islative rulemaking, state agencies exercise a great deal of discretion to
alter people's legal rights that is effectively beyond judicial control,
while with respect to interpretative rulemaking they do not. Courts
may review rules that are wholly interpretative entirely de novo be-
58. Id. § 3-109 Comment.
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cause the adopting agency was not delegated the authority to bind the
courts to any extent by its interpretation.59 As a result a state court
may properly substitute its judgment for that of a state agency as to
the propriety of an interpretative rule, but not with respect to the pro-
priety of a legislative rule. The exemption from rulemaking proce-
dures for interpretative rules may be justified, therefore, on the
ground that the extent to which those rules, in practice, will adversely
affect the legal rights of individuals is relatively small because those
rules may be subject to plenary judicial review. In these circum-
stances, participation by members of the public in the making of in-
terpretative rules must necessarily be somewhat less important than
their participation in the making of legislative rules.
A third justification for the exclusion of interpretative rules from
usual rulemaking requirements has been suggested: An "agency
should be as free as it can be [when it issues interpretative rules] for
the simple reason that those types of regulations are the kind that
agencies should be encouraged to make. . . . "6 Interpretative rules
are needed by the public as well as by the agency to dissipate uncer-
tainty as to the exact meaning and scope of agency administered law.
If rules of this kind were subject to "the notice and other delay called
for by [usual rulemaking procedures], the public would be the first to
suffer.... ,, 61 The reason for this is that the burden of following
those procedures is bound to discourage agencies from issuing such
rules. The volume of interpretative rules issued by agencies is likely to
be much larger than the volume of their legislative rules. As a result,
usual rulemaking requirements which are expensive will present a
more formidable obstacle and disincentive to the making of the for-
mer kind of rules than the latter. To avoid procedures they think un-
duly onerous, agencies may also be able to live more easily without
issuing interpretative rules than without issuing legislative rules. After
all, the latter comprise the substance and teeth of their regulatory
scheme, while the former are only helpful instruments for clarifying
that scheme. Note also that in most situations agencies may clarify
59. See West Des Moines Ed. Ass'n v. PERB, 266 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Iowa 1978); 2 F.
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 787-88 (1965); 2 K. DAVIS, ADmnISTRAThVE LAW TREATISE
§ 7:10-:13 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter 2 K. DAVIS], 4 K. DAVIS, § 29:20 (2d ed. 1984); 1 C. KOCH,
JR., ADmINiSTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.52-.53 (1985); 2 C. KOCH, JR., § 9.13 at 118, 9.18;
2 Am. JutR. 2d, Administrative Law, § 656 (1962 and Supp. 1989). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
60. SENATE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT: LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1946).
61. Administrative Procedure Act, Hearings on S. 1663, Before the United States Senate
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 326 (1964).
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their law on an ad hoc basis rather than by issuing statements of gen-
eral applicability.62
The exemption for interpretative rules may also be justified on a
fourth ground. Without an unqualified and broad exclusion for inter-
pretative rules, there would be uncertainty in many more cases about
the applicability of the good cause exemption. That increased uncer-
tainty would be likely to result in unnecessary litigation and might en-
courage the use of notice and comment rulemaking procedures in
situations where they would be unwise. After all, application of the
good cause exemption to particular interpretive rules will be more un-
clear than application to such rules of a categorical exclusion of all
interpretative rules from usual notice and comment procedures.
Of course, the determination as to whether a particular rule is ex-
empt from usual rulemaking procedures because it is an interpretative
rule will not be entirely free from ambiguity, even though the MSAPA
clearly defines interpretative rules exempt under this categorical exclu-
sion. 63 Courts and agencies have, on occasion, been confused about
the matter." Nevertheless, the analytical distinction between interpre-
tative and legislative rules is reasonably certain,65 and the practical
problems of applying that distinction in order to classify properly par-
ticular rules as either the former or the latter are not unusually large
or insurmountable. From a quantitative and qualitative point of view,
the practical problems involved in determining which rules are inter-
pretative and which are not, are far fewer than the problems that
would be created for agencies by the elimination of this blanket ex-
emption. As noted earlier, the elimination of this exemption would
have a large and adverse effect on agency efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness.
The broad MSAPA exemption from usual rulemaking procedures
for interpretative rules may be criticized because courts have often
given deference to agency interpretative rules, even though they were
not required to do so. 6 Consequently, in practice, interpretative rules
often have a substantial adverse impact on the rights of affected par-
ties. Courts have been especially prone to give such discretionary def-
erence to agency interpretative rules when those rules have been long-
62. See Bonfield, supra note 33.
63. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-109(a).
64. Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy State-
ments, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 530-72 (1977).
65. Id. at 573. See also 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 59, at § 7:8.
66. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 59, at §§ 7:13-7:14; 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADam nuTRATivE LAW
265-66 (1965).
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standing, 67 when the statute interpreted by the rules was reenacted by
the legislature, 68 when the subject matter of those rules is very techni-
cal and, therefore, within the special expertise of the agency, 69 or
when they were written by administrators who were especially familiar
with and personally involved in the adoption of the statute construed
by those rules. 70 The point is that courts have "long given considera-
ble and in some cases decisive weight . . . to interpretative regula-
tions," and while such rules may not be "controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance." '7'
However, as noted earlier, state courts are normally free to substi-
tute entirely de novo their interpretations for those embodied in an
agency rule that is wholly interpretative because the agency was not
delegated authority to bind the courts to any extent with its interpreta-
tion. In addition, as indicated previously, the MSAPA expressly pro-
vides that "[a] reviewing court shall determine wholly de novo" the
validity of an interpretative rule that is adopted without complying
with usual rulemaking procedures. 72 Therefore, a court reviewing an
interpretative rule issued without benefit of usual rulemaking proce-
dures may consider the agency interpretation together with all other
relevant facts and information; but it may not defer in that situation
to the agency's view of the law in question simply because it is the
agency's view.
In addition to prescribing the style, form, and contents of a rule,
(which must include a statement of its purpose and the specific legal
authority for its adoption),73 the MSAPA contains a provision requir-
ing each rule adopted by an agency to be accompanied by a concise
explanatory statement.7 4 The latter requirement seeks to force the
agency to consider carefully the precise reasons for its action and en-
sures that the specific basis and rationale for the rule will be clear to
the public. The formal explanatory statement must contain all of an
agency's legal, factual, and policy reasons for adopting the rule. How-
67. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 59, at § 7:14. See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 275 (1974); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).
68. 2 K. DAviS, supra note 59, at § 7:14. See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 275 (1974); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).
69. 2 AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 675 (1962).
70. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 59, at § 7:14. See also Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
71. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
72. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-109(b).
73. Id. § 3-111.
74. Id. § 3-110(a).
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ever, the language of the MSAPA explanatory statement requirement
does not go far enough in one respect. In order to more fully imple-
ment the ideal of comprehensive rationality, an agency should be re-
quired expressly to include in its explanatory statement all of the
arguments for and against the rule considered by the agency as well as
its reasons for rejecting the arguments against adoption of the rule."5
Such a requirement is desirable for a number of reasons.
Most importantly, forcing an agency to articulate clearly all of the
arguments for and against the rule would force the agency to structure
its consideration of the rule in a better way than is currently required
by even a broad reading of the existing MSAPA reasons requirement.
The additional language would also help to assure much more effec-
tively than the current reasons requirement that the agency in fact
fully considered all of the submissions made in that rulemaking pro-
ceeding. With such a specific provision, an agency explanatory state-
ment that overlooked some of the arguments made against a rule in
the rulemaking proceeding would do so at its peril. Persons opposed
to the rule could use such an omission to prove that the agency vio-
lated its statutory duty to consider fully all of the submissions in that
proceeding. Furthermore, a requirement that the agency formally and
clearly articulate all of the grounds for overruling arguments made
against a rule would force the agency to do what it is supposed to do
in any event-directly and explicitly confront all objections to a pro-
posed rule, and determine whether they are sufficient to prevent its
adoption. Requiring the agency to articulate in the concise explana-
tory statement the precise reasons it rejected arguments made against
a proposed rule would also facilitate public and judicial scrutiny of
the rationality of the agency's action more effectively than the nar-
rower, more general MSAPA requirement that an agency simply artic-
ulate all of its reasons for adopting the rule in question.
Unlike most other APA's, the MSAPA also requires an agency to
maintain an official rulemaking record open to the public for each
rule it formally proposes or adopts. 76 This record must contain all
written submissions to the agency and all other written materials con-
sidered by the agency in connection with that rule. It must also con-
tain a copy of any regulatory analysis issued for the rule and any
official transcript or summary of required oral proceedings in that ru-
lemaking, as well as other specified documents pertaining to the rule."
75. This language was contained in the 1961 MSAPA, supra note 48, at § 3 (a)(2). Despite
the advice of this Reporter to the contrary, it was omitted from the 1981 MSAPA.
76. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-112(a).
77. Id. § 3-112(b).
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The required record is intended to help structure a rational agency
consideration of the rule, to facilitate adequate consideration of the
legality and merits of the rule by members of the public, and to facili-
tate its judicial review. Consequently, the rulemaking record require-
ment, like the requirement of a concise explanatory statement,
implements the ideal of comprehensive rationality.
Following existing law in most states, the MSAPA does not prohibit
oral communications to the agency in rulemaking without the knowl-
edge of other participants in that proceeding; nor does the Act require
such oral communications to be reduced to writing and to be included
in the rulemaking record. The reason for the position of the MSAPA
on this matter is that such a prohibition or requirement is likely to
interfere significantly with the ability of agencies to gauge accurately
the political acceptability of their proposed rulemaking action. 7 Rule-
making procedures will not ensure that agency rules are acceptable to
the legislature if those procedures limit agency access to relevant oral
communications-that is, if those procedures insulate the agency from
any of the information and pressure that would be focused on the
legislature if the legislature sought to make those rules itself.79 Yet this
would be the result of any general ban on oral ex parte communica-
tions in rulemaking, and/or a general requirement that such commu-
nications be reduced to writing and be included in the official agency
rulemaking record.
Legislatures receive much of the information and pressure relevant
to the political acceptability of their proposed statutes from off-the-
record, oral ex parte communications. To ensure that their rules are
politically acceptable, agencies must also be able to receive the same
information and pressure about proposed rules. However, those who
communicate that type of information and pressure to agencies will
not do so as readily, clearly, or honestly, if they must do so publicly,
or if the contents of their communications must be included in an of-
ficial, widely available rulemaking record.
An opportunity to make off-the-record, oral ex parte communica-
tions to the decisionmaker in rulemaking is, therefore, essential to the
implementation of a political model of administrative lawmaking.
Any general requirements that directly or indirectly interfere with such
communications would necessarily result in much more agency rule-
making that is unacceptable to the legislature and the governor. That,
in turn, would be likely to lead to three undesirable consequences.
First, the legislature and governor would have to intervene formally in
78. Scalia, supra note 2, at 38-41.
79. Id. at 41.
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agency rulemaking to void an increasing number of politically unac-
ceptable rules. Consequently, a great deal of legislative and guberna-
torial time and effort would have to be spent on entirely avoidable
problems. Second, the increasing political unacceptability of agency
rules, resulting from the required inclusion of a summary of every ex
parte communication in the rulemaking record, would result in great
tension between the legislature and governor on the one hand and the
agencies on the other. After all, those elected officials are not likely to
be happy with agencies that cannot accurately gauge the political ac-
ceptability of their rules.
Third, other substantial and unnecessary costs would be imposed on
the persons regulated and on the agencies if agencies repetitively made
rules that turned out to be politically unacceptable and, therefore,
were reversed by action of the legislature or governor. Affected per-
sons may have expended needless resources in adjusting their conduct
to the requirements of those short-lived agency rules. They may also
have relied to their detriment on the content of those rules. In addi-
tion, agencies could have utilized their scarce resources for more im-
portant purposes than the issuance of such short-lived, politically
unacceptable rules.
The MSAPA rejects a compromise that would allow oral ex parte
communications in rulemaking, but would require all factual material
relevant to the technical merits of a proposed rule that are contained
in such oral ex parte communications to be summarized in writing and
to be included in the agency rulemaking record. This compromise was
adopted, to some extent, by one federal case.80 The new Model Act
rejects this solution for practical reasons. It would be almost impossi-
ble to enforce such a requirement. That is so because it would be unu-
sually difficult to demonstrate, in any situation, that factual matter
relevant to the technical merits of a rule, rather than opinion or politi-
cal information, was the substance of an oral ex parte conversation
whose content was omitted from the agency rulemaking record. More-
over, the possibility of success, no matter how remote, and the facial
legitimacy of attempts to demonstrate a violation of such a require-
ment, may induce and facilitate lawsuits whose only purpose is to de-
lay the rulemaking process. The law should not be structured in such a
way as to encourage this result.
It would also be very difficult for agencies and courts to draw a
clear line between factual information relevant to the technical merits
of a proposed rule contained in oral ex parte communications, which
80. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-08 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1981).
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must be reduced to writing and be included in the agency rulemaking
record, and material of an opinion or political nature not relevant to
the technical merits of a proposal, which therefore need not be treated
in that manner. Finally, it is unlikely that significant or dispositive
factual information relevant to the technical merits of a proposed rule
will often be communicated to an agency through oral ex parte com-
munications. When such information is communicated to an agency
in that manner, its general substance is also unlikely to remain un-
known to opposing parties in the rulemaking proceeding. Even if op-
posing parties initially discover agency reliance on such information
that was communicated orally and ex parte only in the required state-
ment of reasons issued at the time the rule was adopted, they have a
partial remedy. At the time they discover that information, those per-
sons can petition the agency for a reconsideration of its action,81 and
include in that petition material rebutting the previously unknown fac-
tual data on which the agency relied. In addition, all of that rebuttal
material will be in the record before the court when it judicially re-
views the substantive validity of the rule.
Effective implementation of the political model of administrative
lawmaking appears to require an opportunity for oral ex parte com-
munications with the decisionmaker, and appears to be inconsistent
with any general requirement that such communications be reduced to
writing and be included in the agency rulemaking record. On the other
hand, an undiluted implementation of the comprehensive rationality
ideal of administrative rulemaking appears to require the opposite re-
sult. To ensure that rules are based upon the most complete and high-
est quality information available, opposing parties in a rulemaking
proceeding must be able to ascertain and to challenge, prior to the
time when the agency takes final action, all of the information that it
may rely upon in adopting the rule. At some point, however, the ideal
of comprehensive rationality must accommodate to the conflicting
needs of the political model of administrative rulemaking. In this par-
ticular situation, comprehensive rationality must give way to the polit-
ical model in order to ensure a reasonably effective role for the latter.
However, the compromise in these circumstances for comprehensive
rationality is very narrowly drawn. In reality, it is unlikely to interfere
substantially with the realization of that ideal.
The MSAPA expressly provides that in proceedings in which the
validity of a rule is at issue, only those particular reasons on which the
agency relied in its concise explanatory statement may be used as justi-
81. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-117.
IDEAL RULEMAKING
fications for adoption of the rule.8 2 Consequently, in defending a rule
at the time of judicial review, agencies may not offer additional rea-
sons to justify the rule if the reasons offered for its adoption in the
explanatory statement are inadequate. However, they may offer the
court additional evidence and argument to support the reasons speci-
fied in the explanatory statement.83 And, of course, parties challeng-
ing the rule may offer the court additional evidence and argument to
demonstrate that those reasons are insufficient or improper or that
there are other legal defects in the contents of the rule or in the proc-
ess of its adoption.84
Two kinds of costs are imposed on our society by limiting the rea-
sons used to support a rule on judicial review to those contained in its
explanatory statement, even though additional reasons are available
and would be adequate to support the rule. First, there is the cost of
the additional rulemaking proceedings required to readopt rules held
invalid only because of the inadequacy of the reasons in their explana-
tory statements. Second, there is the cost of the agencies' inability to
enforce rules that are held invalid only because of inadequate reasons
in their explanatory statements. While these costs are considerable,
they are outweighed by the even more considerable benefits that ac-
crue to society by enforcing the principle that the reasons contained in
a rule's concise explanatory statement are exclusive.
Several considerations justify this conclusion. Permitting agencies
to rely on post hoc reasons to defend their rules would encourage
them to offer false, but convenient, rationalizations for their earlier,
otherwise unsupportable actions, and thereby defeat the ideal of com-
prehensive rationality. After all, the purpose of rulemaking proceed-
ings is to ensure that agencies consider fully the lawfulness and
desirability of their proposed rules at the time of those proceedings,
and that agencies adopt proposed rules only if they are lawful and
supported by good reasons at the time of those proceedings. If agen-
cies could rely, in defending their rules, on reasons invented subse-
quent to the adoption of those rules, they could also make their rules
in a way that would entirely remove from the scrutiny of the rulemak-
ing process those later justifications which ultimately become the basis
for upholding the rule. This, too, would defeat the ideal of compre-
hensive rationality. In addition, a prohibition on the use of post hoc
justifications for a rule is necessary to ensure that agencies faithfully
perform another duty dictated by the ideal of comprehensive rational-
82. Id. § 3-110(b).
83. Id. § 3-110 Comment.
84. Id. § 3-112 Comment.
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ity: They must consider carefully, prior to the time they adopt a rule,
all of the reasons why they should or should not take that action. 5
The MSAPA also states that unless otherwise required by law, the
agency rulemaking record "need not constitute the exclusive basis for
agency action on that rule or for judicial review thereof."" Substan-
tial reasons support this provision. The principal effect of requiring
an agency to make its rules exclusively on the basis of an agency rule-
making record or limiting judicial review of a rule to such an agency
record "has often been the dilution of the regulatory process rather
than the protection of persons from arbitrary action."", In addition,
the burden that would be imposed on agencies by requiring them in
every case to assemble their entire factual and argumentative justifica-
tion for a rule prior to its adoption, and to enter that entire justifica-
tion in the official agency record of the rulemaking proceeding, is far
too great to justify such a requirement.
Other problems would also be created if rules were required to be
made or judicially reviewed wholly on the basis of the agency rule-
making record:
Once it is understood that all persons and groups that may be
affected by a proposed rule will be limited to the ... [agency
rulemaking record] in any judicial proceeding challenging the validity
of the rule, the parties participating in the ... [agency proceeding]
would multiply-and so would the issues. Only by participation
would they be able to affect the contents of the record and preserve
the issues they may wish to present to a reviewing court. ...
Because a reviewing court would refuse to hear any objection to a
rule not made during the ... [agency rulemaking proceeding]
participants opposing the proposed rule would voice all possible
objections and introduce data to support them. Since it could not
know which of these objections might eventually become the basis of
a challenge to the rule's validity, the agency would have no choice
but to respond-for the "... record"-to each objection with its
own data and arguments.
All these factors would operate to produce large and diffuse
records that the agencies and reviewing courts would find
cumbersome to manage. [In addition] ... the agency would be
required to conduct such an on-the-record rulemaking proceeding
before issuing any rule, regardless of its importance and even though
85. Id. § 3-106(c).
86. Id. § 3-112(c).
87. Hamilton, supra note 19, at 870-71.
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it is probable that only a small percentage of any agency's rules will
be subjected to judicial review."
Finally, it would be unfair to bind parties to judicial review of a rule
with the agency rulemaking record as the exclusive basis for the
court's determination, if those parties did not participate in the rule-
making proceeding either because they did not know of the proceed-
ing or their interests would not have been affected by the proceeding
at that time. That is why the MSAPA states that a petitioner for judi-
cial review of a rule "need not have participated in the rule-making
proceeding upon which that rule is based." 9 For all of these reasons,
the MSAPA provides that unless otherwise required by law, the
agency rulemaking record need not be the exclusive basis for agency
action on a rule or for its judicial review.9
It is true that the comprehensive rationality ideal would be best
served by requiring rulemaking to be initially determined and judi-
cially reviewed wholly on the basis of the agency rulemaking record.
However, prior discussion suggests that it would be unwise to impose
those requirements on all rulemaking of all agencies. Good rulemak-
ing procedures must strike a fair balance between the need for effec-
tive, efficient, and economical government on the one hand and the
need for procedures adequate to protect private rights against un-
sound or illegal government action on the other. A fair balance be-
tween those competing values is inconsistent with creating a right, in
all rulemaking of all state agencies, to have a rule initially determined
and judicially reviewed solely on the basis of the agency rulemaking
record. In exceptional situations, however, the legislature or an
agency may reasonably decide to impose that requirement. The 1981
MSAPA expressly provides for that situation and facilitates its imple-
mentation.9' No more can be expected from a general APA applicable
to all rulemaking of all state agencies.
The MSAPA provides that a rule is invalid unless it is issued in
substantial compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the Act,
and that a proceeding brought to invalidate a rule on that ground may
not be brought more than two years after the rule's effective date. 92
Most people affected by a rule will know about it within two years of
its effective date. If they neglect, during that period, to challenge the
88. Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REv. 151, 221-22
(1979) (footnote omitted).
89. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 5-107(1).
90. Id. § 3-112(c).
91. Id. §§ 4-101(b), -215(d).
92. Id. § 3-113.
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rule in a court for procedural improprieties in its adoption, they
should be deemed to have waived those objections to the rule. This
seems especially fair in light of the probable detrimental reliance of
others on the rule after several years have passed without a challenge.
Furthermore, those who first become affected by a rule more than
two years after its effective date are unlikely to have been prejudiced
by the agency's failure to follow proper procedures more than two
years earlier. It is unlikely that such persons would have participated
in its formulation at that earlier time, even if all proper procedures
had been followed.
Ordinarily, a rule may be effective only thirty days after its formal
filing in a specified central state office, its indexing, and its publica-
tion in a widely circulated official state periodical. 93 In requiring the
publication of a rule a specified time before it becomes effective, as
well as its filing and indexing, the MSAPA goes beyond the require-
ments of many existing state laws. This provision is intended to ensure
adequate notice of newly adopted rules to all affected persons so that
they may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for its effective
date.
The MSAPA provides that its advance effective date requirement
may be waived for a rule that "only confers a benefit or removes a
restriction on the public or some segment thereof"94 because, presum-
ably, the beneficiaries of such a rule desire it to be effective as soon as
possible. The thirty day advance effective date requirement may also
be waived when a rule "only delays the effective date of another rule
that is not yet effective." 95 This provision enables an agency to delay
in a timely manner the effective date of a published adopted rule
which contains defects that were brought to the agency's attention
subsequent to the publication of that rule but prior to its effective
date. Finally, to accommodate important overriding public interests,
the advance effective date requirement may be waived for good
cause-when an earlier effective date is "necessary because of immi-
nent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. "96 This good cause
standard is more stringent than the "unnecessary, impracticable, or
contrary to the public interest" good cause standard provided by the
MSAPA for waiving usual rulemaking requirements.97 The reason for
this is that waiver of the delayed effectiveness period may deny af-
93. Id. § 3-115(a).
94. Id. § 3-115(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 3-115(b)(2)(iii) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 3-115(b)(2)(iv) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 3-108(a).
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fected parties fair notice of the law they must follow, thereby entrap-
ping them, while the former only denies affected parties an
opportunity to participate in its formulation. In order to minimize the
likelihood of agency abuse of these exemptions from usual effective
date requirements, they are very narrowly drawn and the MSAPA
provides that, on judicial review, the agency has the burden of justify-
ing its finding that a particular rule is properly within their scope.98
The MSAPA contains wholesale exemptions from all rulemaking,
rule effectiveness, and rule publication requirements for ten narrowly
defined classes of rules. These wholesale exemptions include exclu-
sions for the following types of rules: rules concerning only the inter-
nal management of the agency that do not directly and substantially
affect the rights or duties of any segment of the public; rules relating
to specified types of law enforcement policies whose disclosure would
cause enumerated evils; rules relating only to inmates, students, and
patients in a state institution, if adopted by that institution; and rules
pertaining to the use and maintenance of state owned property. 9 In
the case of each one of these wholly exempted types of rules it was
determined that the rulemaking procedures, effective date provisions,
and formal publication requirements, applicable generally to rules,
were either unnecessary, unduly burdensome, or would lead to inef-
fective, inefficient, or uneconomical government. These excluded clas-
ses of rules are, however, still subject to the Model Act's provisions
governing public access to agency law,100 and to its provisions govern-
ing judicial review of agency action.' 0' Each of the excluded classes of
rules is very narrowly drawn. They should be studied carefully be-
cause they work a balanced compromise between the need for an ef-
fective, efficient, and economical rulemaking process and the need for
adequate procedural protections to protect private interests against
unsound, politically unacceptable, or unlawful rules.
According to the MSAPA, any person has the right to petition an
agency for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, including a
rule that is otherwise wholly exempt from its rulemaking, rule effect-
iveness, and rule publication requirements.102 In addition, the Act im-
poses on agencies specific duties in relation to such petitions,
including the duty to take action on the petition within a specific time,
and if that action is a denial, to indicate the specific reasons there-
98. Id. § 3-115(b)(3).
99. Id. § 3-116.
100. Id. § 2-101(g).
101. Id. §§ 5-102; 1-102(2), (10).
102. Id. § 3-117.
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for. 103 These provisions are intended to ensure adequate and timely
consideration by agencies of the merits of such petitions, thereby im-
plementing the ideal of comprehensive rationality and enhancing the
political responsibility of agencies to the community at large.
II. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF RULES
The Model Act creates three schemes for the external review of
agency rules.1 4 The first of these schemes involves the governor. To
the extent the agency itself would have authority to do so, the
MSAPA empowers the governor to veto, that is, to rescind or sus-
pend, all or a portion of any agency rule, or to terminate any agency
rulemaking proceeding. This action may be taken at any time, and for
any reason. A gubernatorial veto of an adopted rule must be executed
by an executive order that is subject to all of the Act's requirements
applicable to the adoption and effectiveness of a rule. 05 When the
governor terminates an ongoing agency rulemaking proceeding, how-
ever, the governor may do so with an executive order that is not sub-
ject to those requirements; but the governor must state the reasons for
the termination of those proceedings in the order.106 In the perform-
ance of this function, the governor is to be assisted by a newly estab-
lished administrative rules counsel.' °
This scheme for executive review of rules is designed to facilitate
coordination of all state agency policymaking by the official ulti-
mately responsible under the state constitution for the administration
of all state laws. It also implements the political model of administra-
tive rulemaking because it provides a direct political check on lawful
agency rules that the community at large finds unacceptable. Note
that the governor is elected and therefore is directly responsible to all
of the people at the polls, and that the governor must exercise the veto
authority over rules by a prescribed means that itself is calculated to
ensure that its consequences are politically acceptable. Empowering
the governor to veto an agency rule at any time rather than only at a
time close to its adoption is desirable because a rule that is acceptable
to the body politic at the time of its adoption may become unaccepta-
ble at a later time due to changed circumstances. Furthermore, the
political unacceptability of a rule may come to the attention of the
103. Id.
104. Note also that agencies are required to review all of their own rules on a periodic and
formal basis, and to issue a public written report thereon. Id. § 3-201.
105. Id. § 3-202(a).
106. Id. § 3-202(b).
107. Id. § 3-202(c).
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governor at a time far removed from its adoption, when complaints
by affected persons alert the governor to the unacceptability of that
rule.
The MSAPA also creates a comprehensive scheme for the legislative
review of agency rules. To implement the political model of adminis-
trative rulemaking, it reaffirms the authority of the directly elected
legislature to veto a rule by statute."08 However, the Model Act rejects
vetoes or suspensions of particular administrative rules by one or two
houses of the legislature acting alone, or by a legislative committee
acting alone."°9 It does so because there are significant state constitu-
tional objections to such legislative vetoes or suspensions of otherwise
lawful rules by means other than the enactment of a statute." 0 It also
does so because the legislature's use of such nonstatutory devices for
this purpose is undesirable."' Many reasons support this conclusion.
First, mechanisms for the veto or suspension of administrative rules
by one or two houses of the legislature or by a legislative committee,
acting alone, eliminate an important feature of the statutemaking
process-the authority of the governor to veto such legislative action.
In doing so, they weaken the governor's bargaining power with the
legislature, and disable that official from checking legislative action
the governor deems unsound. These mechanisms, therefore, unduly
aggrandize the power of the legislature at the expense of the governor.
Furthermore, a mechanism for the legislative veto or suspension of
particular state agency rules is useful primarily as a check against un-
wise rules that are otherwise clearly lawful, since an effective check
against unlawful rules is provided by the courts. Consequently, a leg-
islative veto or suspension of particular agency rules by means other
than statutory will have its primary practical impact on lawful rules
and, in effect, would constitute a pro tanto narrowing of the original
authorizing legislation under which those rules were properly issued.
A narrowing of that authorizing legislation should be executed in the
same manner as the original legislation. Otherwise, a committee, one
house, or two houses of the state legislature, acting alone, would con-
tinually be in a position to nullify proper authorizing action of the
more representative and more definitive lawmaking process by which
statutes are adopted.
In some cases the existence of a legislative mechanism to veto or
suspend rules by less than statutory means may also encourage people
108. Id. §§ 3-203, -204(c).
109. Id. § 3-204 Comment.
110. Id. § 3-204 Comment; see also A. BONFIELD, supra note 8, at § 8.3.2(c).
111. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-204 Comment.
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to reduce their participation in the agency rulemaking proceeding and,
instead, induce them to concentrate their efforts on securing a legisla-
tive veto or suspension. To the extent that this were to occur, the
agency rulemaking process would become superfluous, and many of
the important public benefits resulting from that process would be
lost. Authorizing one or two houses of the legislature or a legislative
committee to nullify or suspend particular agency rules by means
other than the enactment of a statute may also induce administrators
to develop rules primarily on the basis of contacts with legislators
rather than on the basis of public rulemaking proceedings. While con-
tacts with legislators on this subject are essential so that the agency
can accurately estimate the political acceptability of its proposed ac-
tion, agency reliance upon those contacts should not become the pri-
mary source of information for the agency with respect to the matter
in question, because that would render the formal mechanisms for
public participation in agency rulemaking superfluous.
In practice, such a legislative veto or suspension scheme might also
facilitate overinvolvement of the legislative branch in the day-to-day
administration of programs created by statute. Furthermore, it might
induce an unhealthy split in perceived authority over purely adminis-
trative matters, it might confuse the public as to the locus of responsi-
bility for administrative rulemaking, and it might enable the executive
branch and the legislature to pass responsibility for such rulemaking
back and forth between themselves in a way that allows each to blame
the other for its own deficiencies. In addition, an authorization of one
house, two houses, or a legislative committee to veto or suspend par-
ticular agency rules might also give the legislature a false sense of se-
curity, and actually cause it to reduce its overall efforts to review
agency rulemaking in an effective way. This result would be very un-
fortunate because, in practice, devices of this kind are not likely to be
especially effective in eliminating from the huge mass of agency law-
making rules that are politically unacceptable, unsound, or illegal.
Legislatures do not have the time, expertise, staff, or resolve to exer-
cise these mechanisms in a way that would effectively secure that re-
sult for most such agency rules.
Finally, it should be noted that schemes for the veto or suspension
of particular agency rules by the action of one or two houses of the
legislature, or by a committee of the legislature, acting alone, are
viewed by agencies as particularly illegitimate because the agencies un-
derstand that their authority derives from the entire statutory lawmak-
ing process. From the point of view of the agencies, these devices also
appear to be unusually susceptible to improper and unrepresentative
influences that may interfere with their properly authorized missions.
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Consequently, the existence of these devices is likely to cause agencies
to make as much of their controversial law as is possible by ad hoc
adjudication, which is not subject to a legislative veto or suspension
by means less than statutory, rather than by rules which are subject to
such mechanisms. However, any increase in agency lawmaking by ad
hoc adjudication is undesirable." 2
The MSAPA provides for the review of agency rules by a desig-
nated, standing, joint legislative committee." 3 This legislative rules re-
view committee is vested with two major powers calculated to act as
effective checks on agency rulemaking. First, the committee is em-
powered to object formally, at any time, to all or any part of a rule on
the grounds that it is "beyond the procedural or substantive authority
delegated to the adopting agency. 11 4 The agency must then respond
in writing to the committee objection, at which time the committee
may withdraw or modify its objection.' 15 The existence of the objec-
tion is indicated adjacent to the rule when it is published. So long as
the objection has not been withdrawn, the agency has the burden to
demonstrate that the rule or portion of the rule to which it applies is
lawful, whenever it is challenged in court. 16 Empowering the legisla-
tive committee to object to a rule at any time because it is ultra vires
may be justified on two grounds: First, a rule that is lawful at the time
of adoption may become unlawful at a later time due to a change in
circumstances; second, because of staff limitations, the legislative
committee is unlikely to be able to review effectively all new rules of
all agencies at the time of their adoption, to satisfy itself that they are
within the authority of the agencies that adopted them.
Shifting the burden of persuasion to an agency after the filing of
such a formal legislative committee objection may be justified on sev-
eral grounds. It is logical to shift to the agency the burden of demon-
strating the validity of a rule in subsequent litigation when the
designated legislative rules review committee objects to the rule on the
ground that it is unlawful. Unlike the agency, the members of that
legislative committee are directly accountable to the public at the polls
112. See generally Bonfield, supra note 33.
113. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at §§ 3-203, -204.
114. Id. § 3-204(d)(1).
115. Id. § 3-204(d)(4).
116. Id. § 3-204(d)(5). While Florida Statute section 120.545 (1989) authorizes a Florida leg-
islative committee to object to a rule, the Florida Act differs from the MSAPA in one important
respect. The Florida Act is unclear about the actual effect of such a committee objection. The
Florida Act only states that an agency rule adopted in the face of a committee objection will
have notice of the objection published along with the rule. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(8) (1989). It
does not indicate what effect that notice will have in subsequent litigation.
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and represent the body that created the agency and vested it with
whatever authority the agency may lawfully exercise. That committee
also develops over time special competence to monitor the lawfulness
of agency rulemaking. Therefore, the usual presumption of validity
accorded an agency rule"7 should not apply when such a legislative
committee believes the rule to be beyond the authority of the issuing
agency. After all, where a rule has been objected to by the legislative
rules review committee-a body that has special competence to review
the legality of agency rulemaking, that represents the legislature from
which all agency powers flow, and that is independent of the agency
and directly accountable to the people through the electoral process-
there are good grounds to believe that the rule is or may be unlawful
and, therefore, that the burden of persuasion should be on the agency
to demonstrate that it is lawful.
Note, in this connection, that each agency has a vested interest in
construing statutes delegating authority to it as broadly as possible be-
cause such a construction increases the authority of the agency. Insti-
tutional self interest inevitably leads agencies to resolve doubtful
questions respecting the meaning of a legislative enactment in their
own favor, even though agencies may exercise only that authority ex-
pressly or impliedly delegated to them by the legislature. On the other
hand, the legislature already has the authority, which it may exercise
at any time, to reduce the power of an agency by amending or repeal-
ing its enabling act. And while the legislature has a vested interest in
assuring that agencies do not exceed the rulemaking authority the leg-
islature granted them and that legislative supremacy over agency pow-
ers is fully maintained, the legislature seeks only to construe the
intended scope of its own action by authorizing the performance of
this review function by one of its committees. Consequently, the legis-
lature is not as clearly engaged in a self-interested process of aggran-
dizing its own institutional authority as is an agency when the agency
construes the scope of its enabling statute-the action of another
body-to determine the scope of the agency's own powers. This, then,
is another reason why the views of the legislative rules review commit-
tee, an authorized representative of the lawgiver, should be preferred,
at least initially, to the views of the agency when the two bodies disa-
gree about the scope of agency rulemaking powers in a particular in-
stance.
117. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 69 (1937); United States
v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Mathiasen v. State Conservation Comm'n,
246 Iowa 905, 910, 70 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1955); 29 AM. Jun. 2d Evidence § 172 (1967). See also 2
K. DAvis, AwmmnsrKAMvE LAw TREATisE § 11.04 text accompanying n.34, at 56, § 11.06, §
16.07 text accompanying nn.7-1 1, at 456-57 (1958).
IDEAL RULEMAKING
Note, however, that in the end, the administrative rules review com-
mittee "is only authorized to alter one aspect of the procedure by
which the legality of the rule will finally be determined by the
courts.""' 8 This is so because the MSAPA provides that the final deci-
sion with respect to the validity of such a rule rests with the courts and
not with the legislative committee. Nevertheless, in close cases, the
shift in the burden of persuasion as to the validity of a rule resulting
from an objection by the legislative rules review committee will often
determine the outcome of such suits. Consequently, a legislative com-
mittee with authority to object to agency rules in the manner pre-
scribed by the MSAPA will provide a credible check on illegal agency
rulemaking. The mere existence of this mechanism is likely to cause
agencies to think twice before adopting rules of doubtful legality, and
to induce them to withdraw adopted rules of that kind after an objec-
tion has been made.
There are adequate safeguards surrounding the exercise of this legis-
lative committee power to ensure that it is exercised in a responsible
and reasonable manner. As noted, the MSAPA provides a clear stan-
dard against which the committee must operate when it considers
whether to file an objection to a rule. In addition, the committee must
conduct its proceedings in public1 9 and must include the specific rea-
sons for its action in the published objection,120 so that courts and
others who wish to examine the specific grounds supporting an objec-
tion may easily do so. Finally, the objection device would appear to
be constitutional under most state constitutions. 2'
It might be wise to add to the MSAPA provision authorizing the
administrative rules review committee to object to an agency rule be-
cause the rule is ultra vires, a provision authorizing plaintiffs, who
successfully challenge a rule after the filing of such an objection, to
obtain a judgment against the agency for court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees. This unusual remedy might be justified under these
circumstances because the filing of such an objection by a politically
responsible body independent of the agency lends special credibility to
the claim that the agency rule in question is illegal, and it would "re-
move one obstacle-financial expense-that discourages persons from
seeking judicial review of unlawful agency rules."'2
The MSAPA vests the designated, standing, joint legislative rules
review committee with a second major power. It is calculated to check
118. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-204 Comment.
119. Id. § 3-204(b).
120. Id. § 3-204(d)(I).
121. See A. BomELD, supra, note 8, § 8.3.3(k).
122. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 3-204 Comment.
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unsound or politically unacceptable agency rulemaking. That commit-
tee may require an agency to publish as a proposed rule of the agency
a committee recommendation that the agency adopt, amend, or repeal
a rule, and to hold a rulemaking proceeding thereon. But after that
publication and the rulemaking proceeding, the agency is free to ig-
nore the recommendation of the committee.'3 This provision imple-
ments the ideal of comprehensive rationality by ensuring fully
informed agency decisionmaking on the subject of a committee rec-
ommendation that the agency repeal, amend, suspend, or adopt a
rule. It is also geared to ensure increased agency accountability to the
public by focusing some of the same political pressures on the agency,
with respect to the subject at issue, as would be focused on the legisla-
ture. That is, this mechanism is calculated to more fully implement
the political model of administrative lawmaking by forcing the agency
to calculate the acceptability to the body politic of its contemplated
action with respect to the recommendation of the legislative commit-
tee.
Authorizing the legislative rules review committee to require an
agency to initiate such a rulemaking proceeding for this purpose does
not seem to be an undue legislative encroachment on lawful adminis-
trative initiatives. After all, the MSAPA expressly reserves to the
agency full and final authority to decide whether, after that proceed-
ing, it will adopt or reject the proposed rule embodying the committee
recommendation. Of course, if the agency inaccurately gauges the ac-
ceptability to the political processes in the community at large of its
action with respect to the recommendation of this legislative commit-
tee, the agency will pay a serious price. In that situation, the action of
the agency is likely to be overridden by statute, and the agency is
likely to be punished in some way by the legislature for its disregard
of political realities. But this result is sound because the wishes of. the
community at large, as reflected in the current balance of interest
group politics in the state, should prevail over the wishes of the
agency, even if the position of the agency is both sound on its techni-
cal merits and lawful.
The MSAPA contains a third scheme for the external review of
agency rulemaking. It creates a comprehensive scheme for the judicial
review of agency rules, along with other agency action.124 However,
the provisions of the Model Act pertaining to the judicial review proc-
ess are beyond the scope of this article. The same is true of the
MSAPA requirements that would force agencies, "as soon as feasible
123. Id. § 3-204(e).
124. Id. at art. V.
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and to the extent practicable," to make their law through rulemaking
rather than through ad hoc adjudication, and to the extent they con-
tinue to make their law ad hoc in the course of individual cases, to
embody that law subsequently in rules.12 The Model Act provisions
pertaining to both of these subjects are discussed at length else-
where. 126
III. CONCLUSION
The rulemaking and rule review provisions of the 1981 MSAPA are
surely not perfect. In general, however, they represent progress in the
ongoing quest for ideal procedures relating to this subject. They effec-
tively create a rulemaking process that is, to the extent feasible and
practicable, both politically sensitive and comprehensively rational.
They also strike a reasonable balance between the need for effective,
efficient, and economical state government and the need for proce-
dures calculated to ensure that rulemaking is politically acceptable,
technically sound, lawful, and fair. Each state should, therefore, ex-
amine the rulemaking and rule review provisions of the 1981 Model
Act and import into its own law as much of this most recent effort as
is possible.
It could be argued, however, that the 1981 MSAPA rulemaking
provisions fall short of ideal in one major respect. Those provisions
may not go as far as they should to ensure that the procedures im-
posed on state agencies are proportioned to the relative significance of
the varying substantive and process matters at stake in rulemaking
proceedings. An effort to ensure that required procedures are ade-
quately proportioned to the relative significance of the matters at
stake is important for two principal reasons: First, it would reduce the
cost of the overhead of our administrative bodies to the minimum re-
quired to accomplish their objectives; second, it would provide a rea-
sonable assurance that, in practice, the benefits of prescribed
procedures actually exceed the cost of those procedures.
The formulation of rulemaking requirements calculated to ensure
that the procedural overhead involved is satisfactorily proportioned to
the importance of the substantive and process matters at stake is not
an easy task. After all, the substantive matters involved in the various
agency programs implemented by these procedures differ widely in
their importance because the many regulatory and benefactory pro-
125. Id. § 2-104(3)-(4).
126. The judicial review provisions of the MSAPA are discussed at length in A. BONFIELD,
supra note 8. at § 9. The required rulemaking provisions of the MSAPA are discussed at length
in Bonfield, supra note 33.
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grams undertaken by our governments today are extremely heteroge-
neous in their nature, purpose, and effect. The process matters
involved in agency rulemaking proceedings also differ widely in their
importance because the values relating to process sought to be ad-
vanced by rulemaking procedures are also very heterogeneous in na-
ture; they range from the preservation of human dignity and citizen
satisfaction with government to the maintenance of our traditions, ra-
tionality, objectivity, and predictability. In addition, the need for each
rulemaking procedure differs widely in light of the varying objectives
of each of those procedures, the varying effectiveness of each of those
procedures in achieving its objectives, and the varying availability of
less costly means for achieving the desired objectives. Furthermore,
the relative importance of each of the many different matters at stake
in rulemaking proceedings is also difficult to establish, because it de-
pends in large part upon subjective value judgments. Finally, some of
the procedures designed to further substantive objectives of agency
programs may interfere with the effective and efficient accomplish-
ment of the mission of some of the procedures designed to achieve
process objectives, and vice versa. This will require a determination as
to which of these desired objectives should be preferred, and to what
extent. This, too, will involve difficult subjective value judgments.
Nevertheless, we should make an effort to ensure, as far as possi-
ble, that the rulemaking requirements we impose on agencies are pro-
portioned to the relative importance of the varying matters at stake.
After all, maximization of the public interest requires an allocation of
scarce societal resources to their most productive use. In addition, the
cost of these required rulemaking procedures may sometimes unneces-
sarily or unjustifiably interfere with an agency's ability to achieve the
substantive objectives of its programs because that cost may unneces-
sarily or unjustifiably reduce the resources available to the agency for
achieving those objectives. Of course, relatively expensive rulemaking
procedures could be necessary to ensure that a particular program is
executed reliably and accurately, and in the precise manner contem-
plated by the legislature. One may inquire, however, whether the spe-
cific benefits produced by those particular procedures outweigh their
costs, and whether there are less expensive means for satisfactorily ac-
complishing similar results.
Prior discussion demonstrates that, insofar as possible, ideal rule-
making procedures should be proportioned to the importance of the
matters at stake so that their total benefits outweigh their total costs
and so that they are the least expensive means for securing the desired
objectives. The 1981 MSAPA might be criticized because its rulemak-
ing requirements are not adequately calibrated to the widely disparate
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importance of the many varying substantive and process matters at
stake in such proceedings. It may reasonably be argued that the
MSAPA good cause exemption'2 7 does not adequately accomplish this
result, and that the undue rigidity of the MSAPA rulemaking scheme
precludes its accomplishment.
The 1961 MSAPA and the many state acts based upon that earlier
Model Act contain only a single scheme for regulated rulemaking-a
scheme based upon legislative style, notice and comment proce-
dures.128 On the other hand, the federal APA creates two classes of
regulated rulemaking, each governed by a different set of procedures.
Formal rulemaking (rulemaking required by statute to be determined
on a record after an opportunity for a hearing) is subjected by the
federal APA to most of the same judicial style procedures required
for formal adjudication. 29 Informal rulemaking (rulemaking other
than formal rulemaking and exempted rulemaking) is subjected by the
federal APA to legislative style, notice and comment procedures. 30
The 1981 MSAPA follows the federal APA, creating only two classes
of regulated rulemaking, each governed by a different set of proce-
dures. Judicial style rulemaking, involving trial type procedures, is ap-
plicable only when a statute other than the MSAPA expressly requires
the provisions of the MSAPA governing adjudication to apply to par-
ticular rulemaking.' 3' Legislative style, notice and comment rulemak-
ing procedures apply to all other rulemaking governed by that act. 32
As a result, the rulemaking scheme created by the 1981 MSAPA
appears to be both overinclusive and underinclusive. Viewed in light
of the significance of the widely varying matters at stake in such pro-
ceedings, the investment in procedural overhead required by the 1981
MSAPA will be inadequate in some instances of rulemaking and ex-
cessive in others, because of the undue rigidity of the MSAPA rule-
making scheme. After all, any dispassionate assessment of the many
diverse matters at stake in such proceedings would necessarily con-
clude that they could sensibly be grouped on the basis of their relative
importance into more than two categories and, therefore, that the jus-
tifiable investment in procedural overhead in such proceedings should
be more variable than that permitted by a bipolar system. Note, in
this connection, that dissatisfaction with the federal APA bipolar
scheme for regulated rulemaking-formal, judicial style procedures or
127. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
128. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 48, at §§ 3-5.
129. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556-557 (1982).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
131. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at § 4-101(b), art. IV.
132. Id. art. 111.
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informal, legislative style procedures-has led Congress to create, on
an ad hoc basis, hybrid procedures for a significant number of newly
authorized types of administrative rulemaking. 33 In some situations,
hybrid procedures have a distinct advantage. They allow Congress to
more carefully calibrate the procedures required for specified classes
of rulemaking to the relative importance of the matters at stake than
the current, more rigid, bipolar system in which required rulemaking
must involve either full trial type proceedings or minimum notice and
comment proceedings.
Therefore, consideration should be given to amending the 1981
MSAPA so that it would create several distinct classes of agency rule-
making, each subject to different procedural requirements specially
tailored to the needs and circumstances of that particular class. In or-
der to increase the effectiveness of administrative rulemaking, ensure
that the benefits of applicable procedural requirements exceed their
costs, and ensure that those requirements are the least expensive
means for securing desired objectives, it may be desirable to create as
many as five separate classes of regulated rulemaking of descending
degrees of formality and complexity and, therefore, cost. In that way,
there will be a greater opportunity to secure an adequate match be-
tween the procedures required and the significance of the matters at
stake in each type of rulemaking. The MSAPA might prescribe in de-
tail all of the elements of the most formal and complex, hence most
expensive, class of such rulemaking proceedings. It could then define
each of the less formal and complex, hence less expensive, classes of
rulemaking proceedings by reference to its relationship to the most
formal and complex class, so that each of the relatively less expensive
classes of rulemaking proceedings would be peeled down versions of
the most expensive class. The adjudication article of the 1981 MSAPA
uses a similar device to create several different classes of adjudication,
each governed by different procedures of descending degrees of for-
mality and complexity and, therefore, cost. 34 The five classes of rule-
making suggested here might generally be described as follows: full
judicial style rulemaking governed wholly by the MSAPA adjudica-
tion provisions; partial judicial style rulemaking governed by some of
the MSAPA adjudication provisions and some of its current legisla-
tive style rulemaking provisions; full legislative style rulemaking gov-
erned by all of the current MSAPA legislative style rulemaking
provisions; partial legislative style rulemaking governed by some of
the current MSAPA legislative style rulemaking provisions; and sum-
133. ACUS, A Guide To Federal Agency Rulemaking 131 (1983).
134. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 8, at art. IV.
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mary rulemaking governed by very minimum, newly devised provi-
sions.
Of course, empirical studies and experiments will be useful to verify
the assumption that such a multi-classed scheme for rulemaking
would be more desirable than the existing scheme. If the mechanism
by which each rulemaking is initially placed in the appropriate class is
not sufficiently accurate and efficient, it could increase rather than
decrease the cost of agency procedural overhead as compared to the
current system. Consequently, some care must be taken in the consid-
eration of any such reform to be sure that it can deliver in practice as
much as it appears to promise.
As noted, in implementing a reform of this kind, an efficient and
effective mechanism will be needed for assigning each rulemaking to a
particular class on the basis of the importance of the matters at stake.
This means that determinations will necessarily have to be made about
the appropriate placement, within the several classes of rulemaking
proceedings, of particular types of rulemaking. For reasons noted ear-
lier, these determinations will inevitably present great difficulties.
They will require, for a wide variety of rulemaking, an assessment of
the relative importance of the substantive and process matters at
stake, as well as a determination of the desirability of particular pro-
cedures in light of the significance of those matters and the availabi-
lity of less costly alternatives. However, a possible solution to this
problem is also suggested by the 1981 MSAPA adjudication provi-
sions. It may be wise to remit the process of selecting appropriate
agency procedures, within general guidelines furnished by the directly
elected legislature, to a highly visible, politically accountable rulemak-
ing scheme conducted by the affected agency.' This solution may
provide a sensible and widely acceptable means for determining, con-
sistent with democratic theory, the relative importance of the matters
at stake in various kinds of agency proceedings and the consequent
level of expenditure for procedural overhead that is justified in those
proceedings.
There is no doubt that the quest for an ideal rulemaking procedure
must continue. The nature of the quest is such that it has no final
termination point. After all, in the end, what is viewed as an ideal
rulemaking procedure is a matter of judgment, and will vary, depend-
ing upon contemporary values and circumstances. It is also true that
experience with so-called ideal provisions and further experimentation
with new provisions will dictate changes in what may be considered to
135. Id. §§ 4-201, -401, -502.
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be, at any particular time, optimum rulemaking provisions. There-
fore, the views expressed here with respect to the 1981 MSAPA and
an ideal system of state administrative rulemaking must, of necessity,
be subject to subsequent revision in light of additional insights and
experience.
